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With machine learning (ML) technologies rapidly 
expanding to new applications and domains, users are 
collaborating with artificial intelligence-assisted 
diagnostic tools to a larger and larger extent. But what 
impact does ML aid have on cognitive performance, 
especially when the ML output is not always accurate? 
Here, we examined the cognitive effects of the presence 
of simulated ML assistance—including both accurate 
and inaccurate output—on two tasks (a domain-specific 
nuclear safeguards task and domain-general visual 
search task). Patterns of performance varied across the 
two tasks for both the presence of ML aid as well as the 
category of ML feedback (e.g., false alarm). These 
results indicate that differences such as domain could 
influence users’ performance with ML aid, and suggest 
the need to test the effects of ML output (and associated 
errors) in the specific context of use, especially when the 
stimuli of interest are vague or ill-defined. 
1. Introduction  
The breadth of applications of machine learning 
(ML) intelligent systems in predictive decision-making 
scenarios is substantial, and users are interfacing with 
these assistant systems in a multitude of ways. This 
human-ML collaboration is seen in a variety of fields, 
from medical diagnosis and treatment [1,2,3], to 
automated driving systems [4,5], to threat detection [6]. 
ML assistance has also been utilized in aiding visual 
search and predicting the presence of targets in 
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2 Note that these performance terms differ from what is commonly used in the ML development community (true positive, false 
negative, false positive, and true negative, respectively), but the signal detection terms are more commonly associated with user 
studies and therefore the terms that we adopted to describe this research.   
modalities such as baggage screens [7,8,9] and 
simulated combat images [10]. In the field of nuclear 
safeguards, ML diagnostic tools could also be applied to 
assist human users and enhance performance [11,12]. 
No model performs at 100% accuracy however, making 
the examination of how different errors from the ML 
diagnostic algorithm tools affect human decision 
making and performance crucial. 
As in many of the application areas noted above, we 
are focused on ML assistance in the context of target 
detection (e.g., “Is there a tumor in this medical 
image?”) rather than other common ML applications 
such as natural language processing. Previous research 
has found ML model errors do have a significant effect 
on human performance and trust in the system. The 
algorithms’ performance on any given trial falls into 
four classifications drawn from classic signal detection 
theory [13]: Hit, Miss, False Alarm (FA), or Correct 
Rejection (CR).2 See Table 1. A Hit occurs when there 
is an item of interest in an image that is correctly 
identified by the ML algorithm, while a CR is correct 
indication that no target is present. Algorithmic errors 
fall into the general categories of Miss and FA. A Miss 
occurs when there is an item of interest in the image, but 
the ML algorithm fails to identify it; while a FA occurs 
when the algorithm incorrectly identifies the presence of 
an item of interest when none exists in the image. In 
situations with multiple targets, these errors can 
combine (e.g., a “Miss+FA” occurs when the algorithm 
identifies the wrong item of interest in an image). Some 
researchers have found that human trust and use of a 
system is directly related to the system’s performance in 





these four categories [14,15]. Rice [10] found that an 
increase in automation reliability resulted in an overall 
improvement in human–automation performance 
relative to less reliable automation. The researchers also 
found automation false alarms primarily resulted in a 
degradation of compliance, while misses predominately 
resulted in a degradation of reliance. Reduced reliance 
in a system is a behavior typically associated with 
target-absent events (CR). 
 
Table 1: Classic signal detection theory categories within the 
context of target presence ground truth and ML output. 
 
While there is a breadth of research in trust in 
automation, the body of research lacks depth. One major 
drawback to many of these experimental designs is that 
they are highly complex, and therefore filled with 
possible confounding variables. Paradigms have 
included docking spaceships, running power plants, and 
finding targets in complex visual searches such as x-rays 
and combat aerial photographs [14,15,10]. These 
paradigms are context-specific and difficult to apply to 
other domains of human-machine teaming. 
Different contexts might also impact how humans 
use ML outputs. In target detection tasks, ML systems 
are often intended to aid humans’ visual search 
processes. Much of the research on human visual search 
has used simple laboratory stimuli. While some research 
suggests visual search relies on the same active scanning 
processes for both simple laboratory stimuli and 
complex, applied stimuli [16], there is other evidence 
that these differences in visual search paradigms could 
significantly impact human performance. This 
contrasting research argues that visual search 
performance during traditional, simple search tasks is  
not comparable to visual search performance in more 
real-world applications [17]. These differences in 
human performance by visual task type have not been 
investigated in relation to ML algorithms that are 
intended to support human visual search tasks. 
The current study addresses these knowledge gaps 
using a domain-specific target detection task relevant to 
the field of international nuclear safeguards 
(Experiment 1), as well as a classic domain-general 
visual search task (Experiment 2). Simulated ML target 
detection indicators are implemented to investigate the 
effects of different ML error types on human decision 
making and performance for both real world images and 
a basic visual search task. 
2. Experiment 1: Nuclear Cooling Towers 
Experiment 1 investigated the effects of accurate 
and inaccurate algorithmic outputs on human 
performance in a visual search and decision making task 
using real-world images related to the domain of 
international nuclear safeguards. International nuclear 
safeguards are a set of measures and procedures 
implemented through bilateral and multilateral 
agreements between countries and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that a 
country’s nuclear fuel cycle programs are not being 
misused for the development of nuclear weapons 
production. While many of the safeguards measures are 
verified in the field through activities such as material 
sampling, nondestructive assay of nuclear materials, and 
confirmation of facility design, others are conducted by 
analysts at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria. 
An example of a Headquarters-based task is the 
collection and analysis of open-source text and imagery 




Figure 1: Examples of each type of ML category for 
Experiment 1: (a) Hit, (b) Miss, (c) Miss+False Alarm, (d) 
Correct Rejection, and (e) False Alarm. Images available via 
creative commons license [18,19]. 
 
Participants in Experiment 1 were tasked with 
identifying nuclear cooling towers in a set of stimuli that 
consisted of images of buildings and non-buildings, 
with and without nuclear cooling towers. Some 
participants received simulated ML assistance in the 
form of bounding boxes that were placed on the images. 
The participants were told that the bounding boxes were 
produced by a ML algorithm and that they were 
intended to help them find the nuclear cooling towers. 
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They were not given details on the type of ML algorithm 
used to create the output. In reality, the bounding boxes 
were added by the experimenters and manipulated such 
that they produced one of the following ML 
performance categories: Hit, CR, Miss, FA, or Miss+FA 
(see Figure 1 for examples). 
Another subset of participants did not receive 
simulated ML assistance. They had to rely on their own 
visual search process to locate and identify nuclear 
cooling towers in the images.  
We tested how the presence or absence of the 
simulated ML outputs and the different categories of 
ML performance affected the participants’ accuracy and 
response times (RTs) for the task. 
2.1 Methods  
In this task, participants were shown photos and 
asked to indicate whether a nuclear cooling tower was 
present or absent. All photos were collected from Flickr 
and included images both with and without nuclear 
cooling towers (and were part of the set of images 
curated for [12]). In order to select an appropriate subset 
of stimuli for Experiment 1, we first tested a larger set 
of photos in a norming study. We then down-selected to 
240 photos in which accuracy performance for the 
nuclear cooling tower detection task was not at ceiling 
(i.e., near perfect performance). The photos were 
balanced in Experiment 1 so that 60% of photos 
contained a nuclear cooling tower. The task took about 
15 minutes to complete.  
Participants who received the “ML assistance” 
were shown images that contained mock ML outputs. 
When the “ML” identified a target in an image, a red 
bounding box was placed around that item in the image. 
For target absent images, no bounding box was shown. 
No real ML algorithms were used—instead the 
bounding boxes were created by the research team to 
maximize experimental control. The simulated ML 
outputs were correct 80% of the time (112 Hit trials and 
80 CR trials), with the remaining 20% of the trials being 
equally divided between three types of ML errors (16 
each Miss, FA, and Miss+FA trials). All stimuli were 
counterbalanced across 6 between subject conditions, so 
that the same underlying target present image could 
appear as a Hit, Miss, or Miss+FA, and the same 
underlying target absent image could appear as a CR or 
FA.  
A final control condition included the same images 
with no ML output present. Participants who did not 
receive ML assistance saw the same images as 
participants in the other condition, but without any 
bounding boxes. 
Data were collected online using the Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT) platform with the following 
criteria for participants: located in the USA, at least 95% 
prior approval rating, and previously completed at least 
1,000 tasks on AMT. All tasks were identical from a 
participant’s perspective during selection (and 
participants could only see and complete the task once), 
helping to ensure the only differences between 
conditions were those we directly manipulated. We 
chose to target a general population sample rather than 
a professional population for this task due to: (1) access 
to qualified participants (especially during the COVID-
19 global pandemic) and (2) number of participants 
available. AMT has hundreds of qualified workers, 
whereas there are a limited number of professional 
nuclear safeguards analysts. This approach allows us to 
first establish effects in a general population before 
testing the resultant strongest hypotheses on the limited 
professional population in later studies.  
A total of 284 participants signed up for this task; 
data from 51 participants were removed from analysis 
due to attention check trial accuracy below 80% or 
overall accuracy below 60%. Two hundred participants 
provided data for conditions with simulated ML output; 
33 participants provided data for the condition without 
ML output. Additional individual trials (e.g., for a single 
image) were removed if the RT was above three 
standard deviations of that participant’s median RT.  
2.2 Results 
All statistical tests reported here were held at an α 
= .05 level (95% confidence interval). A mixed effects 
model (see [20]) predicting accuracy from the fixed 
effects of nuclear cooling tower target (present or 
absent) and ML output (present or absent), along with 
random intercepts for participant and underlying image 
(regardless of presence of additional ML output) 
revealed a significant crossover interaction between 
target presence and ML output (Z = 21.48, p <.001). The 
simple effects showed significantly higher performance 
on images with nuclear cooling towers than those 
without nuclear cooling towers when ML output was 
provided (Z = 6.04, p <.001) but significantly lower 
performance on images with nuclear cooling tower 
images than those without nuclear cooling towers when 
ML output was not provided (Z = 2.38, p =.017). See 
Figure 2a. 
Next, we examined accuracy performance on each 
type of ML output category (CR, FA, Hit, Miss, and 
Miss+FA) for conditions in which ML output was 
provided. The equivalent for the control condition with 
no ML output is the simple effect of target presence 
(target present “miss” and target absent “correct 
rejection”) in the analysis above. A mixed effects model 
predicting accuracy for trials with ML output from the 
fixed effect of ML category with random intercepts for 
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participant and underlying image (with Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons) revealed 
significant differences (Z > 1.64, p < .05) for all ML 
performance class comparisons except the difference 
between FA and Miss (Z = 2.63, p = .053). Hit images 
had the highest performance, followed by CR and then 
Miss+FA. Miss and FA images led to the lowest 






Figure 2: Proportion correct in Experiment 1 by (a) presence 
of target and ML output and (b) ML category for ML output 
conditions only. Error bars represent standard error of the 
mean calculated on a trial-by-trial basis. 
 
 
We also examined the difference in RTs across the 
ML categories for correct responses. A mixed effects 
model predicting RT for accurate trials from the fixed 
effect of ML category with random intercepts for 
participant and underlying image (with Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons) revealed 
significant differences (Z > 1.64, p < .05) between all 
image comparisons, with the exception of Miss+FA 
relative to CR (Z = 2.46, p = .091). When participants 
responded correctly, their responses were fastest for 
Hits, somewhat slower for Misses, and slowest for FAs. 
Their average response times for CR and Miss+FA 
trials were very similar to one another and fell between 




Figure 3: Response time in Experiment 1 by ML category for 
correct trials. Error bars represent standard error of the mean 
calculated on a trial-by-trial basis. 
3. Experiment 2: T/L search 
To investigate whether these findings also 
extrapolate to a basic visual search task, a second study 
was conducted. The experimental design in Experiment 
2 remained consistent with Experiment 1. However, 
instead of searching for and identifying nuclear cooling 
towers in real-world images, the participants in 
Experiment 2 were tasked with searching for a “T” with 
a perfectly centered crossbar among a set of “L”s 
(asymmetrical distractors with offset crossbars) [21]. 
Also known as a conjunction search task, the T/L visual 
search task is a widely-used laboratory task that controls 
for the confounding variables that can occur in visual 
search tasks that use more naturalistic and complex 
stimuli. The T/L task is commonly used as a domain 
general analog of visual search and decision making for 
both novices and professionals from fields such as 
baggage screening and reviewing medical images (e.g., 
[22]). Once again, performance was assessed via 
accuracy and RT for both correct (Hit and CR) and 
incorrect (Miss, FA, and Miss+FA) ML indicators with 
the T/L-letter stimuli, as well as a control condition in 
which no ML output was provided.  
3.1 Methods  
The methodology for Experiment 2 was similar to 
that in Experiment 1, except the stimuli from the T/L 
task had blue bounding boxes when ML output was 
present (see Figure 4). The underlying stimuli were in 
grayscale, with letters in four shades of gray appearing 
on a cloudy background. Each image had 10 letters and 




letters was a perfect “T” on 60% of the trials. The mock 
ML output was correct 80% of the time and had the 
same proportion of error types as Experiment 1.  
Participants saw a total of 120 images, with half of 
the participants receiving ML output and the other half 
in a control condition with no ML output. When the ML 
output was present, there were a total of 56 Hit, 40 CR, 
8 Miss, 8 FA, and 8 Miss+FA trials. 
Data were collected on the AMT online platform 
with similar data quality checks and cleaning as in 
Experiment 1. Data from a total of 72 participants were 
included in our analysis. 
3.2 Results 
Statistical analyses were conducted in the same 
manner as in Experiment 1. A mixed effects model 





Figure 4: Examples of stimuli for Experiment 2 T/L task for 
(a) Hit (blue bounding box around perfect “T”) and (b) False 
Alarm (blue bounding box around “L”) 
 
of a perfect “T” (target present vs. target absent) and ML 
aid (ML output vs. no ML output), along with random 
intercepts for participant and image, revealed significant 
main effects for the two fixed effects conditions. 
Accuracy performance was higher with than without 
ML output (Z = 3.27, p <.001). Accuracy performance 
was also higher for target absent trials relative to target 
present trials (Z = 5.26, p <.001). This pattern held 






Figure 5: Proportion correct in Experiment 2 by (a) 
presence of target and ML output and (b) ML category for ML 
output conditions only. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean calculated on a trial-by-trial basis. 
 
Next, we compared performance across ML 
categories when ML aid was provided. A mixed effects 
model predicting accuracy for conditions in which ML 
output was provided from the fixed effect of ML 
category (CR, FA, Hit, Miss, Miss+FA), along with 
random intercepts for participant and base image 
revealed significantly lower performance for Miss or 
Miss+FA images relative to CR, FA, or Hit images (all 
p < .05, with Tukey correction for multiple 
comparisons). See Figure 5b. 
We also investigated the effect of ML category on 
RT performance for correct trials. A mixed effects 
model predicting RT on accurate trials from the fixed 
effect of ML category with random intercepts for 
participant and underlying image (with Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons) revealed 
significantly faster responses for Hit trials relative to all 






responses to Miss trials relative to all other types (Z > 
1.64, p < .05) except Hit trials. See Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Response time in Experiment 2 by ML category for 
correct trials. Error bars represent standard error of the mean 
calculated on a trial-by-trial basis 
4 Discussion 
In this study, we found that aid from a simulated 
ML algorithm influenced decision makers’ accuracy 
and response times. These differences were found in 
both a domain-specific international nuclear safeguards 
task where we asked participants to identify photos 
containing a nuclear cooling tower, as well as in a 
classic domain-general visual search task in which 
participants were asked to identify a perfect “T” amidst 
a field of asymmetrical “L”s. However, the nature of the 
differences in performance varied across the domain-
specific and domain-general tasks. 
The presence or absence of ML output led to a 
different pattern of accuracy performance for the two 
different tasks. For the T/L task, participants had higher 
accuracy for the target absent trials than for the target 
present trials, regardless of ML condition. Adding ML 
outputs improved participants’ accuracy for both target 
present and target absent trials. The benefit of the ML 
outputs was higher for the target present trials (likely 
because the ML Hits made it easier to find many of the 
targets). However, participants still performed best on 
the target absent trials. 
A very different pattern of performance appeared 
for the nuclear cooling tower task. Once again, 
participants performed better on target present trials 
when ML aid was provided. However, providing ML 
outputs in the nuclear cooling tower task led to worse 
performance on the target absent trials.  The breakdown 
of performance by ML output category shows that this 
decline in accuracy is driven by the trials where the ML 
output was a FA (i.e., when the ML output incorrectly 
indicated that a nuclear cooling tower was present for a 
target absent trial). In the T/L task, participants rarely 
endorsed the ML’s FAs. They correctly indicated that 
there was not a “T” present on 95% of the FA trials. In 
contrast, the participants frequently went along with the 
incorrect ML output in the nuclear cooling tower study, 
responding correctly on only 36% of FA trials. The 
participants also had very long average RTs for the FA 
trials in the nuclear cooling tower study, indicating that 
it took them a relatively long time to decide on a 
response. However, they ultimately agreed with the ML 
output in most cases. 
When considering the other two types of ML errors 
(Miss and Miss+FA), we also see different patterns of 
performance across the two experiments. In the T/L 
task, participants had numerically higher accuracy for 
the Miss trials than for the Miss+FA trials, although this 
difference was not statistically significant. In the nuclear 
cooling tower task, participants had significantly higher 
accuracy for the Miss+FA trials than for the Miss trials. 
Both of these trial types contain a target, but the ML 
output is either absent or placed incorrectly around a 
different item in the image. In the T/L task for Miss+FA 
trials, participants can quickly evaluate the letter inside 
of the bounding box and determine that it is not a perfect 
“T”. If they do not search the rest of the image to see if 
a “T” is present elsewhere, they will answer incorrectly. 
Participants performed much better on items in this 
condition in the nuclear cooling tower task. In this case, 
there are two routes that may have led them to the 
correct answer. First, they may have searched the rest of 
the image and spotted the nuclear cooling tower (similar 
to participants who answered correctly in the T/L task 
by searching the rest of the image to find the “T”). 
Alternatively, the participants in the nuclear cooling 
tower experiment may have trusted the ML output and 
responded accordingly. As with the FA trials, they may 
have been more likely to go along with what the model 
was telling them. 
While complex visual search tasks are assumed to 
rely on the same visuospatial abilities as simple visual 
search, there are many factors that may be leading to 
these differences in our current findings. Researchers 
have argued that the decision-making component of 
search and decision tasks may play a stronger role in 
complex visual stimuli detection tasks [23]. As seen in 
complex visual search tasks such as X-ray image 
inspection [24,25], participants in the current study 
could have been relying more heavily on top-down 
processes of object recognition decision making to 
identify more difficult cooling tower targets. When 
comparing a simple conjunction task to an X-ray 
inspection task, researchers found different underlying 
visual-cognitive processes were predictive of 
performance, as well as little overlap in performance in 
the two tasks [17]. These differences in visual-cognitive 
abilities and top-down processing demands could be 
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contributing to our current findings associated with 
performance in response to ML aid in our two tasks. 
This highlights the importance of studying similarities 
and differences between domain-general and domain-
specific tasks. The T/L task is one of the most 
commonly used domain-general analogs for 
professional visual search applications, but the highly 
controlled nature of the task can also lead to reduced 
generalizability to more realistic domain-specific tasks. 
What makes the FA images more difficult to detect 
in the nuclear cooling task (lower accuracy and slower 
response times) compared to the T/L task? Participants’ 
familiarity with the target item, as well as the level of 
ambiguity of the stimuli, may play a role. For our stimuli 
set, the degree of difference between a perfect “T” and 
an “L” is always large and quite clear. However, our 
more realistic application using nuclear cooling tower 
images is not always as clear. Our participants are 
unlikely to be as familiar with nuclear cooling towers as 
they are with the letter “T”, and therefore may not have 
as strong of a mental model of just what constitutes a 
nuclear cooling tower (relative to a perfect “T”). 
Furthermore, the photos of nuclear cooling towers are 
also much more complex and varied. These concerns are 
especially important for less prototypical examples of 
nuclear cooling towers. What if the nuclear cooling 
tower is partially dismantled? Or if the photo captures a 
plume above a building on the horizon that looks very 
similar to plumes seen with nuclear cooling towers? A 
common—and critical—aspect of these more realistic, 
domain-specific applications is that the signals are often 
noisier and more ambiguous than typically seen in 
highly controlled, domain-general lab tasks. 
In both the nuclear cooling tower and T/L tasks, 
participants must search for a potential target candidate. 
But in the nuclear cooling task, deciding whether a 
target candidate is indeed the sought-after item plays a 
large role [see 26]. The longer RTs for FA images are 
consistent with pausing longer to decide whether the 
item identified by the ML algorithm is in fact a nuclear 
cooling tower. Despite the pause, frequently participants 
ultimately agreed with the inaccurate ML output, as 
indicated by the low accuracy performance for FA 
images. 
In a classic study on trust in automation, Lee and 
Moray [27] noted that operators tend to rely on 
automation (in our case, ML aid) more when trust 
exceeds self-confidence. We posit that identifying a 
nuclear cooling tower is inherently more ambiguous and 
challenging than identifying a perfect “T” amidst 
asymmetrical “L”s. When given ML output for nuclear 
cooling towers, participants may put more trust in that 
output (due to their lack of self confidence in knowing 
exactly what constitutes a nuclear cooling tower). 
Therefore, they may also more heavily rely on the ML 
aid and use it to help tailor their understanding of 
appropriate nuclear cooling tower characteristics. 
The need to develop a mental model to better 
understand edge cases around what constitutes a 
classification type (e.g., “nuclear cooling tower”) is not 
limited to tests of the general population. Professionals 
using ML aid to better perform their tasks must also 
develop a mental model of key traits during training and 
through experience. If a newly minted nuclear 
safeguards professional works with ML aid while 
learning to inspect images, she may rely on that model 
output to help her learn how she should be categorizing 
items (e.g., she might incorrectly add features from false 
alarms to her mental model).  Further research is needed 
to tease out the consequences of ML errors for varying 
levels of expertise and types of tasks. 
For example, future studies could delve into the role 
of ambiguity of and familiarity with the stimuli by (1) 
running a similar study with nuclear cooling tower 
images using participants who are quite familiar with 
identifying nuclear cooling towers (e.g., from the 
nuclear safeguards community) and (2) running a 
similar study with the T/L task where the difference 
between a perfect “T” and “L” is reduced, making it 
much more difficult to perceive whether the letter stem 
is perfectly centered (“T”) or slightly offset (“L”). 
Future work could also delve into the role of more 
complex and noisy images (e.g., providing variants of 
nuclear cooling towers in more simplistic, controlled 
stimuli). 
By understanding the underlying causes and roles 
of differences between applied, domain-specific tasks 
and highly controlled, domain-general tasks, we can 
better understand and predict the cognitive effects of 
ML errors for target detection tasks in new application 
spaces. 
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